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“It’s a lot of real G’s doing time ’cause a groupie bit the truth and told a
lie.”1
In the United States most rapes are never reported. Most reported rapes
are not prosecuted. Most prosecuted rapes do not result in convictions.
The vast majority of rapists are never held to account for their actions in
any way. Many victims of rape anticipate, with reason, that they will not
be believed by the authorities or will lose in court—perhaps because
they are not believed or perhaps because the triers of fact value the
rapists over them, blame the woman for the rape, or do not care that they
were raped, thinking the harm trivial or the law against rape repressive.
Many African American women dread both the legal system’s racism
against Black men and its racist devaluation of their rape.2

1. TUPAC, I GET AROUND (Jive Records 1993) (encapsulating the tension present
in rape law: balancing the desire to avoid gender bias and to protect the interest of the
victim against the interest in protecting potentially innocent accused individuals).
2. CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY 748, 751-52 (Foundation Press 2d
ed. 2007) [hereinafter MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY] (examining connections between
sexuality and rape, and noting that even with rape law reform in the United States there
has been little improvement in reporting and conviction rates); see also Jennifer
Wriggins, Rape, Racism and the Law, 6 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 103, 122 (1983)
(describing instances where police have taken Black women’s rape claims less
seriously, and noting that this is concerning because “Black women are much more
likely to be victims of rape than are white women”); Gail E. Wyatt, The Sociocultural
Context of African American and White American Women’s Rape, 48 J. SOC. ISSUES
77, 78 (1992) (explaining that African American women may still be cautious about
coming forward because of their perceptions of society).
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I. INTRODUCTION
The above statements encapsulate two principal fears that rape cases
often elicit: (1) that innocent defendants will be unjustly imprisoned as a
result of false accusations by women, and (2) that a rape victim’s trauma3
will be trivialized.4 False rape claims by White women against Black men
as well as the United States’ violent racial history of lynching have
strengthened the first fear.5 The reality for many women of color has been
that, along with being raped and treated as a commodity, women of color
historically have lived in fear of losing their fathers and husbands to the
slaughter that traditionally followed accusations of rape issued by White
women against Black men during slavery and the Jim Crow era.6 Scholars
delving into the rape law area should particularly be conscious of this
painful history and cognizant of the need to maintain a balance between
providing a fair trial for the defendant and protecting the rights of the
victim.7 Achieving this balance is especially crucial considering that,
concurrent with our jurisprudential history of false prosecution, our judicial
system has historically accorded less credibility to non-traditional victims.8
“Non-traditional victims” in this article refers to women who do not fit the
profile of the stereotypical rape victim. This Article will explore the
relevant issues for two types of non-traditional rape cases; rape cases where
the victim is a prostitute and multi-partner rape cases. The choice of those
3. See David P. Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Rape in the Criminal Justice System,
87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1194, 1378 (1997) (noting that a large number of
acquaintance rape victims do not take legal action against their rapist because of their
“fears of a hostile or overly skeptical criminal justice system”).
4. See Tamara Larsen, Comment, Sexual Violence Is Unique: Why Evidence of
Other Crimes Should Be Admissible in Sexual Assault and Child Molestation Cases, 29
HAMLINE L. REV. 177, 200 (2006) (“[L]aws have historically been premised on the fear
of women making false allegations of rape.”).
5. See Lisa M. Calderon, Rape, Racism, and Victim Advocacy, THE BLACK
COMMENTATOR, July 8, 2004, available at http://www.blackcommentator.com/98/98
_calderon_rape_racism_pf.html (“Women are often blamed for their own victimization
by either making ‘poor choices’ or not getting out of the situation sooner. However,
the analysis of who is a ‘good’ or sympathetic victim, who is the ‘bad’ stereotypical
perpetrator, and what is the appropriate community or legal response, is not so simply
defined. Add to the mix an alleged victim who is White, the accused who is Black, and
the criminal offense of sexual assault. Here is where the concept of justice is at a
crossroads, and the issues of rape and racism collide.”).
6. See Riots and Massacres in the Jim Crow South, CHICKEN BONES: A JOURNAL
FOR LITERARY AND ARTISTIC AFRICAN-AMERICAN THEMES (2007) http://www.
nathanielturner.com/jimcrowriots.htm (detailing riots and mass murders of Black
Americans in the wake of rape accusations by White women).
7. See Calderon, supra note 5 (asserting a critical analysis of standards rape
victims face that create a victimhood paradigm).
8. See Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 3, at 1247-50, 1254 (discussing the
characteristics of a rape victim that juries generally find sympathetic, particularly the
victim’s appearance and apparent intelligence, which jurors often associate with middle
class and credibility).
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two types of cases does not, however, exclude the application of this
Article’s analysis for all types of non-traditional rape victims.
During slavery and the Jim Crow era, the two types of non-traditional
rape victims least likely to find justice in courts were women of color raped
by slave owners and married women raped by their husbands.9 While the
treatment of women as property is the dominant link between those two
groups, true solidarity was impeded by the fact that, despite their
vulnerable status, in court White women’s words carried more credibility10
than those of Black men11 and Black women.12 It has been reported that
80% of the 453 men executed for rape in the United States between 1930
and 1989 were African American.13 Black women are least likely to be
believed in courts, but are among those more likely to be the victims of
sexual assault.14 Black women “are generally considered to be subjected to
a higher incidence of rape than white women in the American
population . . . but African American women who are raped, like all
9. James W. Fox, Jr., Intimations of Citizenship: Repressions and Expressions of
Equal Citizenship in the Era of Jim Crow, 50 HOW. L.J. 113, 160 (2006) (noting that in
the Jim Crow South “rape was a crime only when the victim was a white woman”); see
also Michelle J. Anderson, From Chastity Requirement to Sexuality License: Sexual
Consent and a New Rape Shield Law, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51, 64-65, 65 n.69
(2002) (“Under slavery, white slave owners expected their female slaves to be available
to them sexually . . . . Under this reign of white male patriarchy during slavery, Black
women could not seek legal recourse for any such acts of sexual violence perpetrated
against them by any man.”).
10. MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY, supra note 2, at 751 (“The exception to
substantial impunity for rape in America occurs in the least frequent [cases]: the rape of
white women by African American men. As philosophy professor Angela Y. Davis
analyzes this reality, ‘[w]hile rapists have seldom been brought to justice, the rape
charge has been indiscriminately aimed at black men, the guilty and innocent alike.’”
(quoting ANGELA Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE, AND CLASS (Random House, Inc., 1st ed.
1983)). See generally DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN
SOUTH (Rev. ed. La. State Univ. Press 2007) (1969) (detailing the controversial
Scottsboro trial that convicted nine young Black men of raping two White girls despite
questionable facts).
11. See Pamela D. Bridgewater, Ain’t I a Slave: Slavery, Reproductive Abuse and
Reparations, 14 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 89, 132-33 (2005) (“However, some of these
prosecutions helped maintain other aspects of social control. For example, the Mann
Act was used against a black man who took his fiancée, a white woman, across state
lines. Many historians and commentators believe that this aspect became the Act’s
primary application.”); see also Denise C. Morgan, Jack Johnson: Reluctant Hero of
the Black Community, 32 AKRON L. REV. 529, 545-47 (1999) (discussing the bias that
boxer Jack Johnson faced in the criminal justice system because of his past associations
with White women).
12. See Andrew Elliot Carpenter, Chambers v. Mississippi: The Hearsay Rule and
Racial Evaluations of Credibility, 8 WASH. & LEE RACE & ETHNIC ANC. L.J. 15, 20-21
(2002) (examining the influence that Black witness stereotypes had on the credibility of
their testimony in rape cases).
13. See GARY D. LAFREE, RAPE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUAL ASSAULT 141 (1989) (noting that before the Civil War, rape
laws in the United States “treated black and white offenders differently”).
14. Cf. MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY, supra note 2, at 752 (theorizing that because
of racist reasons, African American women receive little protection from the American
judicial system).
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women, seldom report it.”15 The existence of this encoded racial hierarchy,
both in legal and social practice, has polarized drastically the two groups.16
It is because of this painful history that we must consistently interrogate
and scrutinize our jurisprudence to make sure that all vestiges of
commodification of women are eradicated.17 It is also incumbent upon us
to develop standards that carry out these goals with no prejudice to
potential defendants.18 Reality shows that rape law has, thus far, been
unable to address the societal biases of judges, juries, prosecutors, and
other members of the justice system. 19 The fact is that “the United States
has yet to judicially recognize that systematic gender bias in state rape
laws, facially and in their ineffective enforcement, discriminate against
women victims of violence.”20 Until the complete eradication of gender
15. See id. (explaining that some of the sexual violations that are least likely to
occur are the most likely to be forcefully prosecuted).
16. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of
Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1438 (1991)
(describing the devaluation of Black women as women and as mothers).
Slave owners forced women to lie face down in a depression in the ground
while they were whipped. This procedure allowed the [slave owner] to protect
the fetus while abusing the mother. It serves as a powerful metaphor for the
evils of a fetal protection policy that denies the humanity of the mother. It is
also a forceful symbol of the convergent oppressions inflicted on slave women:
they were subjugated at once both as Blacks and as females.
Id.
17. See Michèle Alexandre, Dance Halls, Masquerades, Body Protest and the Law:
The Female Body as a Redemptive Tool Against Trinidad’s Gender-Biased Laws, 13
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 177, 180 (2006) (“Vestiges of these repressive views of
women’s bodies still remain not only in men’s and women’s psyches but also in
societal norms and in legal concepts. For example, the United States, which purports to
have achieved the greatest strides in the struggle for women’s rights, still grapples with
the idea of an autonomous female body.”).
18. This Article limits the discussion of rape law and non-traditional rape victims
to heterosexual rape. There are, however, additional issues affecting other types of
non-traditional victims as well as issues involving same-sex sexual assault.
19. See TIMOTHY C. HART & CALLIE RENNISON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS
SPECIAL REPORT: REPORTING CRIME TO THE POLICE, 1992-2000, at 1 (Mar. 2003),
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/rcp00.pdf (citing that only 31% of
rapes were reported between the years of 1992 and 2000); see also Tom Linninger, Is It
Wrong to Sue for Rape?, 57 DUKE L.J. 1557, 1585 (2008) (noting the judicial tendency
to misconceive the rape victim as “vindictive, greedy, or mentally unstable”); Andrea
Giampetro-Meyer & Amy Fiordalisi, Toward Gender Equality: the Promise of
Paradoxes of Gender to Promote Structural Change, 1 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L.
131, 140 (1994) (book review) (explaining that “although rape is probably one of the
single most devastating crimes a woman could experience, rape victims often are
treated with disdain and insensitivity in the courtroom”).
20. See MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY, supra note 2, at 742 (“[W]omen have
historically been excluded from the authoritative processes through which community
rules are made, interpreted, and enforced . . . . Historically, even when civil claims for
so-called seduction were recognized, the legally injured party was the young woman’s
father . . . .”); see also Jane E. Larson, Women Understand So Little, They Call My
Good Nature “Deceit”: A Feminist Rethinking of Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 374,
401-03 (1993) (detailing the history of seduction in the common law and intentional
misrepresentation laws in various states, and asserting that both types of law
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bias21 from rape laws is made an expressed goal by the legislature and
judicial bodies, women, particularly non-traditional women, will continue
to suffer from implied and express gender biases in the implementation of
rape laws.22
This Article argues that the standard for consent applied in rape cases is
erroneous and particularly harmful to non-traditional rape victims. This
Article therefore proposes a change from the current, implicit, contractual
idea of consent to a continuum-based idea of consent. The continuumbased idea of consent directly contradicts the idea that consent is finite in
time and cannot be withdrawn once given. Instead, it considers that the
withdrawal of consent can occur at any time during sexual interaction(s).
Courts’ treatment of non-traditional rape victims when applying the current
consent standard perpetuates gender biases23 in ways that nullify the very
purpose of the rape shield laws.24 In addition, the purported “reasonable”
standard is often misleading.25 In fact, these decisions are full of sexist
assumptions and inferences about the victim’s sexual behavior, which
courts use to justify their decisions to allow evidence of the victim’s past
sexual conduct.26 This type of evidence unfailingly permeates the jury’s
decision as to whether or not the victim’s behavior and past acts are worthy
of protection.27 In light of this trend, it is imperative not only to reform the
Rape Shield Statute so as to prevent biased applications, but it is also
crucial that judges and juries undergo strict gender deconstruction and bias
eradication training.28 Gender deconstruction for judges and juries is
crucial because, despite the existence of formal rules to protect victims,
discriminate against women in rape cases).
21. See Ilene Seidman & Susan Vickers, The Second Wave: An Agenda for the Next
Thirty Years of Rape Law Reform, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 467, 472 (2005) (“[R]ape is
the least reported, least indicted, and least convicted non-property felony in America.”).
22. A. Thomas Morris, Note, The Empirical, Historical and Legal Case Against the
Cautionary Instruction: A Call For Legislative Reform, 1988 DUKE L.J. 154, 165
(1988) (recognizing additional race-based judicial bias of rape victims).
23. See Seidman & Vickers, supra note 21, at 485 (asserting that the law should
require affirmative consent as opposed to assuming that a women’s silence is a result of
coyness).
24. See Anderson, supra note 9, at 55-56 (arguing that promiscuous women who
were raped were treated unfairly by courts).
25. Cf. Note, Patriarchy is such a Drag: The Strategic Possibilities of a
Postmodern Account of Gender, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1973, 1976-77 (1995) (discussing
the changing perceptions of what is objective or reasonable behavior for the female
gender in general).
26. See Kathryn M. Carney, Note, Rape: The Paradigmatic Hate Crime, 75 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 315, 347 (2001) (describing past statements by politicians and judges
that indicate gender bias).
27. See Anderson, supra note 9, at 56 (explaining that many of the norms behind
past chastity requirements continue to determine whether courts find past sexual
behavior relevant).
28. See Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 3, at 1259 (discussing the effects that
gender bias has on the decisions of juries in rape cases).
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societal norms regarding sex and women are such that popular notions of
appropriate behavior for women become the tacit backdrop of these cases.29
This Article further analyzes the implementation of rape shield statutes
in cases of non-traditional rape victims. In doing so, this Article explores a
sample of rape cases where the victims are prostitutes. Courts’ gender
biased application of the rape shield statutes in cases where the victim is a
prostitute, for example, illustrates the shortcomings of rape shield
statutes.30 The task, consequently, is to determine what reforms would best
work to prevent the introduction of gender bias while not undermining the
rights of the accused pursuant to the Sixth Amendment. These proposed
changes, however, could not be considered without taking into account the
complex and varied nature of rape victims.31 Any attempts at reforming the
rape shield statutes must include a priori rules designed to protect
individuals who do not fit society’s stereotypes of a rape victim.
This Article is divided into the following: Part II investigates the
continuum-based idea of consent in rape cases; Part III describes the
provisions of the Rape Shield Statute and its application; Part IV provides
specific instances of gender bias in the application of rape shield statutes in
rape cases involving victims who are prostitutes; Part V proposes
amendments and alternative standards to rape shield statutes and considers
these proposals’ import in the application of rape shield laws to the multiparty rape context; finally, Part VI considers policy reasons for the
proposed changes and how they would help advance our rape
jurisprudence.

29. See Christina E. Wells & Erin Elliot Motley, Reinforcing The Myth of the
Crazed Rapist: A Feminist Critique of Recent Rape Legislation, 81 B.U.L. REV. 127,
146-49 (2001) (explaining that courts relied on negative connotations about women to
put the rape victim on trial instead of the perpetrator).
30. See Karin S. Portlock, Status on Trial: The Racial Ramifications of Admitting
Prostitution Evidence Under State Rape Shield Legislation, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1404,
1407 (2007) (noting that admission of evidence linking the victim claimant to
prostitution defies the purpose of the rape shield legislation and that admission of such
evidence “disproportionately discourages the rape claims of prostitutes of color.
States’ various prostitution exceptions compromise the protections of the shield at the
expense of these women, a group that is particularly vulnerable to frequent sexual
attack.”).
31. Heather C. Brunelli, Note, The Double Bind: Unequal Treatment for
Homosexuals within the American Legal Framework, 20 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 201,
230 (2000) (noting the importance of examining how “rape shield statutes will affect
all people,” non-traditional rape victims included).
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II. CRITICISM OF THE CURRENT CONTRACTUAL STANDARD AND
EXPLORATION OF A CONTINUUM-BASED STANDARD OF CONSENT
A. The Detrimental Influence of the Contractual Standard of Consent
While the traditional contractual idea of consent is a good framework for
regulating goods and services, it is detrimental when applied to rape law.
This, however, seems to be the de facto standard for consent that has been
used where courts attempt to decipher whether consent has occurred in
cases of rape.32 Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 22:
(1) The manifestation of mutual assent to an exchange ordinarily takes
the form of an offer or proposal by one party followed by an acceptance
by the other party or parties.
(2) A manifestation of mutual assent may be made even though neither
offer nor acceptance can be identified and even though the moment of
formation cannot be determined.33

The idea that consent is finite in time underlies this definition of mutual
assent. Once proven by assent or by conduct, courts often seek to ratify the
terms of the contracts. This view is illustrated further in Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 18, which states that “[m]anifestation of mutual
assent to an exchange requires that each party either make a promise or
begin . . . performance.”34 This understanding of consent is tacitly present
in the treatment of consent in rape cases. Under this norm,
affirmative consent standards and limitations on the defense of mistaken
belief operate as inducements for revealing preferences and for ensuring
that others’ preferences be respected. Stringent mens rea requirements
mean that the negative externalities of individual transactions must be
taken into account, thereby reducing the inefficiencies of coercive
heterosexuality. [R]eformulated legal standards for sexual consent might
be seen as an active reconfiguration of sexual interactions in a manner

32. See Lise Gotell, Rethinking Affirmative Consent in Canadian Sexual Assault
Law: Neo Liberal Subjects and Risky Women, 41 AKRON L. REV. 865, 887 (2008)
(arguing that courts’ decisions in rape cases still involve an economic framework).
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 22 (1981).
34. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 18 cmt. b (1981), which states:
[W]here a bargain has been fully performed on one side, there is commonly no
need to determine the moment of making of the contract or whether the
performing party made a promise before he performed. Those issues
ordinarily become important only when a dispute arises at an earlier stage. In
the typical case such a dispute involves an exchange of promises before any
performance takes place; there is an offer containing a promise and made
binding by an acceptance containing a return promise. Section 50. The
beginning or tender of performance may operate as such a return promise
under § 63. In less common cases, acceptance may be made by a performance
under § 54, and the beginning of performance may have an intermediate effect
of making the offer irrevocable under § 45.
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that infuses normative sexuality with an entrepreneurial logic.35

This standard of consent operatively converts victims into perpetuators.
Similarly, the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), which regulates the
sale of goods, defines consent or acceptance as a finite process capable of
being garnered by lack of an express statement. Under § 2-606 of the
U.C.C.:
(1) Acceptance of goods occurs when the buyer
(a) after a reasonable opportunity to inspect the goods signifies to
the seller that the goods are conforming or that he will take or retain
them in spite of their non-conformity; or
(b) fails to make an effective rejection . . . but such acceptance does
not occur until the buyer has had a reasonable opportunity to inspect
them; or
(c) does any act inconsistent with the seller’s ownership; but if such
act is wrongful as against the seller it is an acceptance only if
ratified by him.
(2) Acceptance of a part of any commercial unit is acceptance of that
entire unit.36

The above contractual ideas of consent/acceptance have been transposed
in the drafting and implementation of rape law’s definition of consent
without regard to the fact that a woman’s body is not analogous to goods or
services.37 Our jurisprudence’s initial view of women as property and its
failure to directly address the inherent gender biases in laws affecting
women explain the perpetuation of these inadequate laws. The subjugation
of women’s bodies and the law’s treatment of women’s bodies as
commodities and goods, rather than as women’s exclusive domain, have
been the subject of many scholarly works.38 Still, gender bias has been so
pervasive that legislative and judicial bodies have not directly addressed
how these destructive views undermine the laws that were initially created
to protect women.
This neglect has taken place with the tacit approval of society, which
also has a vested interest in promoting these subversive views of women’s
bodies.39 While the eradication of gender bias from society is a centuries35. See Gotell, supra note 32, at 874 (explaining that when viewed through the lens
of mutual assent, sexual interaction becomes like a market transaction).
36. U.C.C. § 2-606 (2004).
37. See Robin L. West, Legitimizing the Illegitimate: A Comment on Beyond Rape,
93 COLUM. L. REV. 1442, 1449-52 (1993) (devaluating the theory that we should view
sex as a commodity and apply contract theory to rape law).
38. See, e.g., Gotell, supra note 32, at 872-73 (discussing the effects that the
comparison of rape to economics has had on rape cases).
39. Vivian Berger, Man’s Trial, Woman’s Tribulation: Rape Cases in the
Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 21-22 (1977) (surveying critical analysis of rape
victims that historically has presented concerns of “deliberate lies,” “female psychic
diseases,” social and religious pressures, and other fears of false claims).
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old task, scholars, judges, and legislators can begin the task by directly
addressing the inherent bias in rape laws.40 One of the means to
accomplish this is to redefine the notion of consent to reflect the idea that a
woman’s body should be within her exclusive control at all times, and that
access to her body has to be obtained by periodic and expressed
verification of consent.41 When exploring a defendant’s contention that an
alleged rape was in fact consensual intercourse, courts plough through the
circumstances surrounding the rape to determine whether evidence of
consent by the victim can be pinpointed.42 In doing so, old contractual
concepts, like the implied consent cited in the comment to Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 18,43 have become one of the accepted methods of
determining the existence or non-existence of mutual consent.44 The
application of a contractual view of assent to rape cases is one of the means
through which rape shield statutes have been circumvented.45
The contractual ideas of acquiescence, reliance, and estoppel are tacitly
employed in the evaluation of these circumstances where even a woman’s
silence out of fear during a rape can still be used against her as evidence of
consent.46 In cases involving a woman too fearful to speak up during her
rape,47 courts evaluate the circumstances from the rapist’s perspective and
40. See Gotell, supra note 32, at 872 (observing that the Canadian consent standard
is changing as judges place more emphasis on sexual autonomy and the burden of
acquisition of clear consent on those initiating sexual contact).
41. See id. at 886 (describing the shift toward a positive and specific consent
standard by Canadian courts and the necessity to give expressed verification of
consent).
42. Cf. Anderson, supra note 9, at 57 (addressing the New Jersey Supreme Court’s
definition of consent as specific and directed toward the specific act of penetration, and
arguing that consent to sexual intercourse is not freely transferrable from person to
person).
43. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 18 cmt. a (1981)
(acknowledging that assent to the formation of a contract must be manifested, but that
assent can occur through conduct other than words).
44. See Annotated Legal Bibliography on Gender, 12 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER
471, 512 (2005) (contending that implied consent as a defense to rape should be
eliminated and replaced with a requirement of verbal consent).
45. See James T. McHugh, Interpreting the “Sexual Contract” in Pennsylvania:
The Motivations and Legacy of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Robert Berkowitz,
60 ALB. L. REV. 1677, 1680 (1997) (discussing a case where a rape conviction was
overturned because the court focused on a contractual interpretation of the incident
without considering other factors such as the victim’s fear).
46. See Steven I. Friedland, Date Rape and the Culture of Acceptance, 43 FLA. L.
REV. 487, 506-07 (1991) (citing a study that found jurors routinely considered the rape
victim’s nonverbal behavior, including body language, to determine whether the victim
consented).
47. See GENDER VIOLENCE: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 173 (Laura L.
O’Toole & Jessica R. Schiffman eds., 1997) [hereinafter GENDER VIOLENCE]
(“Overwhelming evidence supports the contention that rape and coercive [sexual
behavior exists] . . . for women in our culture. One sample of 930 randomly selected
women, taken from a probability survey of households in San Francisco, found that 44
percent of those who completed the in-person interview had experienced rape or
attempted rape. Of these, 50 percent had been raped more than once.”).
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erroneously apply contractual notions of equity.48 The idea is that the
victim’s silence led the rapist to believe that consent existed, that he had
grounds to rely on such perceived consent, and that, because of her silence,
she is now estopped from holding him accountable.49 In other words,
silence equals acquiescence. The contrary view—that the alleged rapist
must secure verbal unequivocal consent at each step of the transaction—has
generally not been imposed on defendants.50 This failure is rooted in the
gender-biased perception that a woman’s silence during sex is often a form
of consent.51 According to pre-set gender roles, men are viewed to actively
chase and hunt women until the women eventually give in, even after
demonstrating substantial resistance.52 Her very resistance is viewed as a
favorable form of foreplay in which she says “no” and is perceived as
really meaning “yes.”53 If her express “no” can be so easily ignored, her
silence is as effortlessly and commonly interpreted as acquiescence.54
Consider California’s statute defining consent.
In prosecutions under Section 261, 262, 286, 288a, or 289, in which
consent is at issue, “consent” shall be defined to mean positive
cooperation in act or attitude pursuant to an exercise of free will. The
person must act freely and voluntarily and have knowledge of the nature
of the act or transaction involved.
A current or previous dating or marital relationship shall not be
sufficient to constitute consent where consent is at issue in a prosecution
under Section 261, 262, 286, 288a, or 289.55

48. See McHugh, supra note 45, at 1682 (noting that the appellate courts
considered the victim and defendant’s previous social interactions to determine it was
reasonable that the defendant believed the victim wanted to engage in sexual
intercourse with him).
49. See JOAN MCGREGOR, IS IT RAPE? ON ACQUAINTANCE RAPE AND TAKING
WOMEN’S CONSENT SERIOUSLY 207-09 (2005) (refuting the argument that because a
large amount of communication is nonverbal, men should not be required to obtain
verbal consent, with the argument that it is categorically unreasonable to infer consent
from silence).
50. See id. at 114 (arguing that requiring consent at each stage of the sexual
encounter helps both parties because it is a display of equality and respect for bodily
autonomy).
51. See id. at 209 (pointing to data indicating that women who do not want to
participate in sex sometimes rely on nonverbal refusals, but noting that the lack of
verbal consent should not be construed as consent).
52. See GENDER VIOLENCE, supra note 47, at 176 (citing early psychoanalytic rape
theories that held rape was the result of a woman’s unconscious desire to be seduced).
53. See id. (explaining the traditional view of rape: it is a result of men’s
uncontrollable sexual appetites coupled with women’s flaunted sexuality, and that
ultimately, rape happens because women want sexual intercourse).
54. See McHugh, supra note 45, at 1678 (discussing a rape case where the victim
and defendant acknowledged that the victim said “no,” but the appellate court held that
it was reasonable for the defendant to believe that her “no” was not a revocation of
consent).
55. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.6 (West 2008) (stating that the statutory definition
of consent shall not affect the burden of proof or the admissibility of evidence related
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Comparatively, a Massachusetts rape statute states:
Whoever has sexual intercourse or unnatural sexual intercourse with a
person, and compels such person to submit by force and against his will,
or compels such person to submit by threat of bodily injury and if either
such sexual intercourse or unnatural sexual intercourse results in or is
committed with acts resulting in serious bodily injury . . . shall be
punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life or for any term of
years.56

Alabama, on the other hand, defines consent generally in criminal
behavior as:
(a) In general. The consent of the victim to conduct charged to constitute
an offense or to the result thereof is a defense if such consent negatives a
required element of the offense or precludes the infliction of the harm or
evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense.
(b) Consent to bodily harm. When conduct is charged to constitute an
offense because it causes or threatens bodily harm, consent to such
conduct or to the infliction of such harm is a defense only if:
(1) The bodily harm consented to or threatened by the conduct
consented to is not serious; or
(2) The conduct and the harm are reasonably foreseeable hazards of
joint participation in a lawful athletic contest or competitive sport;
or
(3) The consent establishes a justification for the conduct under
Article 2 of Chapter 3 of this title.
(c) Ineffective consent. Unless otherwise provided by this Criminal Code
or by the law defining the offense, assent does not constitute consent if:
(1) It is given by a person who is legally incompetent to authorize
the conduct; or
(2) It is given by a person who by reason of immaturity, mental
disease or defect, or intoxication is manifestly unable and known by
the actor to be unable to make a reasonable judgment as to the
nature or harmfulness of the conduct; or
(3) It is given by a person whose consent is sought to be prevented
by the law defining the offense; or
(4) It is induced by force, duress or deception.57

Alabama’s statute absolutely prevents the use of consent as a
justification where the law strictly protects a class of individuals, such as in
the case of statutory rape.58 It is significant that the statute allows consent
to consent).
56. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 22(a) (LexisNexis 2008).
57. ALA. CODE § 13A-2-7 (1975).
58. See ALA. CODE § 13A-2-7 cmt. (1975), which states
[Section] (3) covers situations involving certain types of sexual misconduct, or
“statutory rape,” or sodomy where the penal statute defining the offense clearly
ignores, or rejects, the actual consent of the particular victim in order to protect
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as a defense in cases involving “non-serious bodily injury” and in cases
where the transaction is mutually entered into (such as athletic events), but
not for serious bodily injuries.59 The fact that consent is allowed in rape
cases (except statutory rape), analogizes rape to a benign bodily injury or
an athletic interaction.60 The commentary following the statute explains
that
[t]raditionally the courts have recognized, or applied, the principle that
consent may be a defense to criminal liability in cases of insignificant
injury where there is no public policy to the contrary, but in cases of
more serious injury only where there is public acceptance of the type of
transaction and consent to the risk involved. Thus, there is no liability
for simple assault and battery resulting from mutual “horse play” type of
jostling of swimmers at an outing, although some kind of minor bodily
harm was foreseeable.61

Both of these analogies are problematic and demonstrate the law’s
failure to understand the deep trauma and injury that is rape. These
analogies also demonstrate the failure of the legislature and judiciary to
recognize their own gender-bias in minimizing the effect of rape.
Victims of rape suffer lifelong psychological and sometimes biological
effects of the physical violations.62 In fact, some rape victims may never
completely recover from those effects.63 For many, “rape can destroy one’s
sense of safety, feelings of integrity and worth . . . . Dread and terror of
rape and anticipation of its possibility can set limits to women’s freedom of
action and access to a full life.”64 Rape, of course, is not only limited to
women—other marginalized members of society have also been the victims
of these hateful crimes.65

the entire class of which he or she happens to be a member.
59. See id. (noting that the availability of consent as a defense can be a result of

public policy concerns: where there is public acceptance of behavior, consent is often a
viable defense).
60. See id. (indicating some of the acts that cannot be consented to include such
things as fist fighting and dueling).
61. Id.
62. See Gina M. Wingood & Ralph DiClemente, Rape Among African American
Women: Sexual, Psychological and Social Correlates Predisposing Survivors to Risk of
STD/HIV, 7 J. WOMEN’S HEALTH 77, 78 (1998) (asserting that rape victims suffer from
myriad long-term health effects including chronic anxiety, alcoholism, and
psychological distress, and that rape victims engage in high-risk sexual behaviors more
often than women who have not been raped).
63. Cf. Ann Wolbert Burgess & Lynda Lytle Holmstrom, Rape Trauma Syndrome,
13 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 981, 982-84 (1974) (explaining that after a rape victim has
moved through the first or acute stage of trauma that occurs immediately after attack,
he or she will enter a second, long-term stage that can affect motor activity, sleep, and
general psychological health).
64. MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY, supra note 2, at 755.
65. See MCGREGOR, supra note 49, at 4 (citing a study that found one in four
female college students had been the victim of rape or attempted rape).
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Arizona’s statute, in contrast to Alabama, defines consent in the
following manner:
“Without consent” includes any of the following:
(a) The victim is coerced by the immediate use or threatened use of force
against a person or property.
(b) The victim is incapable of consent by reason of mental disorder,
mental defect, drugs, alcohol, sleep or any other similar impairment of
cognition and such condition is known or should have reasonably been
known to the defendant. For purposes of this subdivision, “mental
defect” means the victim is unable to comprehend the distinctively
sexual nature of the conduct or is incapable of understanding or
exercising the right to refuse to engage in the conduct with another.
(c) The victim is intentionally deceived as to the nature of the act.
(d) The victim is intentionally deceived to erroneously believe that the
person is the victim’s spouse.66

The California definition that consent can be interpreted in an “attitude
pursuant to an exercise of free will” is the type of vague definition that
perpetuates the idea that the slightest bit of non-negation, if deemed to be
the result of “free will,” could mean consent.67 Under this analysis, the act
of being passive might still be problematic. Defining what constitutes “free
will” and understanding the subjective fear that a woman might experience
mandates that the burden of obtaining consent be viewed more strictly. For
instance, Arizona’s definition of lack of consent as the product of clear
coercion, incapacity, or intentional deception does not add any categorical
burden to secure open and express consent, even in the absence of these
extreme circumstances.68 The reasoning underlying the Arizona statute
seems to be that “but for” any circumstances that do not fit into those
categories even a lack of express consent could be considered consensual.69
Thus, the de facto effect is to shift the burden of proof to the victim to
prove that the sexual interaction occurred without consent rather than
placing the burden on the defendant to prove that it happened with express
consent.70 This problem can be solved by a legislative mandate that
66. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1401 (2008).
67. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.6 (West 2008).
68. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1401 (defining “without consent” but

remaining silent on what constitutes consent).
69. But see State v. Witwer, 856 P.2d 1183, 1185 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (noting that
the meaning of “without consent” is not limited to the situations described by the
statute).
70. Justice for rape victims remains a major problem. See Ronet Bachman &
Raymond Paternoster, A Contemporary Look at the Effect of Rape Law Reform: How
Far Have We Really Come?, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 554, 555-59, 573 (1993)
(indicating that victim’s rights groups fought for rape law reform because of the
tendency to blame the victim; although a number of jurisdictions have changed the
consent standard to bring the focus back on the accused, the results have been mixed).
See MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY, supra note 2, at 751 (“Although social attitudes
toward rape victims may have improved slightly beginning in the 1970’s . . . rape law
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consent be obtained expressly and at every step of the sexual interaction,
and that consent be defined as capable of taking place on a continuum.
B. The Continuum-Based Consent Standard Defined
The disconnect between overwhelming evidence of culpability in many
rape cases and jury verdicts of acquittal has been described as “the divide
between elite and popular opinion about sexual mores and gender roles.”71
One of the reasons for this divide lies in our problematic view of consent.72
Many rape statutes allow “consent” as a defense to rape even when force is
involved.73 In these cases, consent has been interpreted implicitly from the
most passive of actions of the victims. Despite the fact that rape is
inherently a violent crime that generates fear, it has traditionally been
overlooked judicially that “consent in this world of fear is so passive that
the woman consenting could be dead and sometimes is.”74 Thus, consent is
assumed not from the presence of a verbal “yes” at each step of the sexual
transaction, but by the mere absence of a loud “no,” often needing to be
accompanied by physical evidence of non-consent.
The divide between societal perceptions of women and the reality of
women’s lives can be mended. To do so, we must redefine our standard of
consent. A new standard should include a paradigm of consent that defines
consent as taking place on a continuum. Unlike the traditional view of
consent, the new paradigm for consent understands that the granting of
consent in rape cases is not rigid. In fact, in these cases, the granting of
consent should be viewed as fluid, not finite in time, thereby capable of
being withdrawn at any time. The proposed standard requires that, in cases
where a defendant alleges consent, a defendant must first prove that
express and present consent was explicitly obtained at the time of the actual
sexual interaction, not before or after; express consent entails verbal or
written assent that leaves no doubt as to the victim’s agreement to the
reform efforts in the United States in the 1970’s and 1980’s, largely inspired by
women’s critiques, produced little to no detectable improvements in reporting, arrest,
or convictions rates . . . .”).
71. Donald Dripps, After Rape Law: Will the Turn to Consent Normalize the
Prosecution of Sexual Assault?, 41 AKRON L. REV. 957, 957-58, 966 (2008) (“Elite
opinion values sexual autonomy and suspects, when it does not despise, sexual
aggression. Popular opinion supposes that sexual autonomy may be forfeited by
female promiscuity or flirtation, and views male sexual aggression as natural if not
indeed admirable.”).
72. See Anne M. Coughlin, Sex and Guilt, 84 VA. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1998) (noting
that whereas men are stereotypically “strong and assertive,” women are stereotypically
“weak and acquiescent” and therefore naturally unable to protect themselves against
the primal sexual desire of men).
73. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-2-7 (1975) (allowing consent to bodily harm as a
defense to rape).
74. See Catherine A. MacKinnon, Reflections of Sex Equality Under Law, 100
YALE L.J. 1281, 1299 n.91 (1991) (quoting ANDREA DWORKIN, INTERCOURSE 129
(1987)).
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sexual interaction. Second, if the defendant is able to establish express,
present, and uncontroverted consent to the sexual interaction at issue, the
burden will shift to the prosecution to demonstrate withdrawal of consent;
withdrawal of consent can happen at any time during the sexual interaction.
Third and finally, a defendant’s subjective state of mind is never a defense.
This continuum-based definition of consent in rape cases is the most
efficient and equitable approach to solving the consent conundrum in these
cases.
Thus, in this proposed standard, the burden is initially placed on the
defendant claiming consensual sex to prove express consent within the
parameters of the case at bar, precluding him from using any evidence of
past sexual behavior or any circumstantial evidence of consent. Evidence
of a victim’s manner of clothing or conduct during circumstances unrelated
to the sexual interaction would also not be admissible to prove consent.
The ease with which our rape shield statutes are minimized75 evidences a
deep failure to truly comprehend how consent operates.
The idea of consent as an all or nothing grant or denial of access seems
to be rooted in a contractual view of sexual consent.76 Under this contractbased paradigm, we think of a sexual interaction as happening at a finite
time, we envision that consent is given or inferred from past behavior, and
from that point on, performance, in essence, begins for the parties
involved.77 Consequently, indications of a woman’s attempt to withdraw
consent at some point later in the interaction are often disregarded. The
ease with which withdrawal of consent is disregarded stem from the
traditional contract-based view that the defendant relied upon the consent
given and would be prejudiced if consent was subsequently withdrawn.78
This idea protects in part the contractual expectations of the defendant and
is inspired by the contractual concept of part-performance.79 In other
75. See Anderson, supra note 9, at 55 (arguing that although facially most rape
shield laws appear to protect rape victims, exceptions to the laws effectively destroy
their protections).
76. See Sakthi Murthy, Comment, Rejecting Unreasonable Sexual Expectations:
Limits on Using a Rape Victim’s Sexual History to Show the Defendant’s Mistaken
Belief in Consent, 79 CAL. L. REV. 541, 566 (1991) (addressing the stereotype
underlying the idea of a contractual view of sexual consent, which is that the male sex
drive is inherently distinguishable from the female sex drive).
77. See id. (noting that a contractual view of sexual encounters leads to the premise
that men are justified in their sexual expectations because of the unrelenting nature of
male sexuality).
78. See Matthew R. Lyon, Comment, No Means No?: Withdrawal of Consent
During Intercourse and the Continuing Evolution of the Definition of Rape, 95 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 277, 280-81 (2004) (observing that the common law disallows rape
prosecutions if a woman withdraws consent after intercourse has begun).
79. See McHugh, supra note 45, at 1684 (expressing the majority rule that because
the lack of consent at the time of penetration is the determinative factor to analyze
whether a rape has occurred, a rape has not occurred if consent is withdrawn after
penetration).
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words, from circumstantial evidence,80 we interpret the contract as only
capable of having been made at the inception of the sexual interaction.
Accordingly, once the contract is made, all steps subsequently taken by the
defendant are in reliance on the original terms of the contract. If,
consequently, a contract is identified and a defendant is deemed to have
relied on these contractual terms, courts often implicitly conclude that
negating the existence of the contract would cause too great of an injustice
to the defendant.81 Thus, even if the facts overwhelmingly point to a
victim’s attempt to withdraw consent, empathy for the defendant’s
perceived reliance on the would-be contract often leads to an acquittal.82
This normative view of consent is faulty and founded on the historical view
of a woman’s body as a commodity and, therefore, akin to goods capable of
being transacted.83
Multi-partner rape cases, as well as other rape cases involving nontraditional rape victims, would benefit from redefining consent as existing
on a continuum where it can be granted and/or withdrawn at any time,
without any allegations of a breach.84 This continuum-based idea of
consent would not only support the many decades of feminist scholarship
advocating for society to recognize a woman’s right to control her body
without external interferences and restrictions, it would also provide us
with a paradigmatic counter to the traditional contractual standard which
can help better frame our legal discussions and decisions.85
The continuum-based idea of consent moves away from traditional
contractual ideas of consent. Consequently, it also rejects contract law’s
notion that one who cancels a contract without any cause is entitled to a
remedy.86 Section 2-106 of the U.C.C. governs the cancellation of
contracts for the sales of goods and states that a cancellation “occurs when
either party puts an end to the contract for breach by the other and its effect
80. See People v. Barnes, 721 P.2d 110, 119 (Cal. 1986) (recognizing possible
reactions of rape victims and noting that some rape victims “become helpless from
panic and numbing fear”) (citation omitted).
81. See McHugh, supra note 45, at 1682 (citing the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania’s willingness to find contractual reliance based on prior social
interactions, including sexual innuendo, and repeated phone calls and visits).
82. See id. at 1687 (“This abstraction of sexual relationships has made it easier for
men to assert and maintain coercive power and then defend their actions through a
sympathetic legal system.”).
83. See id. at 1688-90 (providing examples of the historical view that women’s
bodies are commodities, similar to the traditional understanding that a woman is her
husband’s property).
84. See id. at 1692-93 (explaining that courts often find a permanent explicit
contractual agreement in the cases of married women and prostitutes—married women
have essentially consented to sex with their husbands for eternity and prostitutes cannot
deny one man while offering her services to another).
85. See Lyon, supra note 78, at 280 (suggesting that a requirement of consent both
pre- and post-penetration is necessary to adequately protect victim’s rights).
86. See U.C.C. § 2-106(4) (2004).
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is the same as that of ‘termination’ except that the canceling party also
retains any [right to a] remedy for breach of the whole contract or any
unperformed balance.”87 This notion explains the sympathy that juries and
judges seem to feel for defendants in rape cases where the defendant and
the victim had prior consensual sexual interactions.88 Since women’s
bodies are viewed as goods, the underlying assumption has often prevailed
that consent to access once should signify consent to access forever.89 This
is so even with the enactment of rape shield statutes that preclude the
introduction of the victim’s sexual past.90 Despite that preclusion, a
victim’s sexual history with a defendant has often been found to be
probative. Under that pretext, the defendant is often acquitted despite
overwhelming evidence that the defendant did in fact rape the victim.91
The proposed continuum-based approach to consent has not been
recognized by courts, as is evidenced by the way courts’ decisions
perpetuate misconceptions about perceived flexibility in the appropriation
of women’s bodies.92 Despite the formal equality that legal rules, such as
rape shield statutes, originally strived to provide, the actual implementation
of these rules has been quite limited and has influenced gender-biased
reprobation of the choices and lifestyles of non-traditional rape victims.93
Legislation must render the eradication of gender bias a mandatory goal in
87. See U.C.C. § 2-106 n.3 (stating that the purpose of subsection (4) is to make the
distinction between termination and cancellation clear).
88. John H. Biebel, Note, I Thought She Said Yes: Sexual Assault in England and
America, 19 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 153, 163-64 (1996) (noting the tendency of
juries to assume that the victim consented based on evidence of a past relationship
between the rapist and the victim).
89. See, e.g., Ivey v. State, 590 S.E.2d 781, 784 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (finding that
because the victim worked as a prostitute and had engaged in sexual relations with the
defendant previously, the jury could have reasonably believed that the sex was
consensual).
90. See Murthy, supra note 76, at 542-43 (noting that even the federal rape shield
statute has been circumvented in order to allow evidence of mistaken belief of consent
when the victim is “promiscuous”).
91. See State v. Sanchez-Lahora, 616 N.W.2d 810, 814, 817 (Neb. Ct. App. 2000)
(overturning a rape conviction because the lower court impermissibly excluded
evidence of a prior sexual relationship between the victim and the defendant, despite
the fact that a jury had found the defendant guilty of sexual assault and “terroristic
threats”).
92. See Lyon, supra note 78, at 292-93 (citing a description by the North Carolina
Supreme Court that found withdrawal of consent cannot effectively occur during a
sexual act, it can only occur before or between sexual acts).
93. See Rosemary C. Hunter, Gender In Evidence: Masculine Norms vs. Feminist
Reforms, 19 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 127, 132 (1996) (“Judgments about prejudice are
also culturally embedded. For example, common stereotypes about African American
women, ‘promiscuous’ women, and prostitutes ensure that any probative value their
prior sexual history might conceivably have in a rape case would inevitably be
outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Thus prior sexual history evidence in these cases
should be excluded. Research for this article uncovered little discussion and few
examples of the possibility that a rape complainant’s sexual history might be excluded
on the ground that it was more prejudicial than probative.”).
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judges’ construction of jury instructions.94 While some have proposed the
eradication of juries as a means of preventing bias, that solution might not
be as far-reaching as a redefinition of the consent standard, considering that
gender bias permeates all aspects of the adjudication of rape cases.95
III. THE RAPE SHIELD STATUTE
The current contractual view of consent has undermined the application
and construction of rape shield statutes. Consequently, these statutes also
need to be reformed to reflect an express commitment to the eradication of
gender bias in rape cases. Rape shield statutes are designed to prevent the
introduction of biased evidence of past sexual conduct in rape cases.96
Despite this mandate, evidence of past sexual conduct is routinely admitted
in rape cases via the use of exceptions in rape shield laws.97 Consequently,
the Rape Shield Statute,98 which was designed to prevent the introduction
of bias in rape cases, is now inadequate to carry out that purpose.99 This
problem is especially present in cases involving non-traditional rape
victims.100 In rape law, the prototype of a sympathetic rape victim is that of
a woman considered chaste by society and whose sexual assault takes place
with extreme force of violence, leaving her near death.101 Rape victims
with an active sexual history, particularly a past sexual history with the
defendant, are less sympathetic as victims.102

94. See Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 3, at 1196 (arguing that rapists go
unpunished in large part because of rules created by male judges, including the use of
the “cautionary instruction” that warns the jury about false rape accusations).
95. See id. at 1197-98 (suggesting the use of the term “rape” itself leads to gender
bias because it implies the crime is sexually motivated instead of violent).
96. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.020(3) (2008) (stating that evidence
introduced for the purpose of attacking the character of the victim is barred except for
certain specific exceptions); see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42 (Consol. 2008)
(barring evidence of the victim’s past sexual conduct except for delineated exceptions).
97. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42 (Consol. 2008); WASH. REV. CODE.
ANN. § 9A.44.020 (2008).
98. FED. R. EVID. 412.
99. Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Constitutionality of “Rape Shield” Statute
Restricting Use of Evidence of Victim’s Sexual Experiences, 1 A.L.R.4th 283, § 2
(1980) (noting a case where the court held that the rape shield statute prohibited the
defendant from presenting a defense because evidence of the victim’s past sexual
conduct was barred pursuant to the statute).
100. See Anderson, supra note 9, at 113 (stating that a “number of rape shield
statutes allow for the introduction of a victim’s prior criminal convictions when they
involve moral turpitude, which would likely include prior convictions for prostitution.”
(citing N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42 (Consol. 2008))).
101. See Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 3, at 1199 (noting that despite legislative
changes to rape laws, there has been little impact on the outcome of rape cases, and
arguing that more drastic reforms, such as requiring affirmative consent before a sexual
act, might resolve the problem).
102. See Carney, supra note 26, at 346-47 (citing examples illustrating the negative
perception of non-traditional rape victims).
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The Rape Shield Statute was created to prevent the introduction of
prejudicial evidence to the detriment of rape victims.103 Evidence of the
victim’s sexual history was readily introduced in rape cases prior to the
enactment of federal and state rape shield statutes.104 States have adopted
versions of the Rape Shield Statute since the 1970s to prevent the
introduction of evidence capable of harming the character of rape
victims.105 Despite this intent, rape shield statutes have been unsuccessful
in preventing the introduction of gender-biased evidence that often leads
juries to be prejudiced against rape victims.106 Furthermore, in the absence
of carefully crafted, gender-bias free jury instructions by judges and
deliberate application of bias-free standards of review for motions in
limine, the interpretation given to those types of evidence is limited to
narratives of society’s view of appropriate conduct for women engaging in
sexual negotiation.107 The Virginia rape shield statute, for example,
provides, in pertinent parts:
(A) In prosecutions under this article, general reputation or opinion
evidence of the complaining witness’s unchaste character or prior sexual
conduct shall not be admitted. Unless the complaining witness
voluntarily agrees otherwise, evidence of specific instances of his or her
prior sexual conduct shall be admitted only if it is relevant and is:
(1) Evidence offered to provide an alternative explanation for
physical evidence of the offense charged which is introduced by the
prosecution, limited to evidence designed to explain the presence of
semen, pregnancy, disease, or physical injury to the complaining
witness’s intimate parts; or
(2) Evidence of sexual conduct between the complaining witnesses
103. See Joseph A. Colquitt, Evidence and Ethics: Litigating in the Shadows of the
Rules, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1641, 1659 (2007), which explains that
while rape-shield rules vary by jurisdiction, the statutes or rules generally
prohibit the use of a victim’s character propensity evidence involving sexual
conduct in litigation, including the sexual history of the alleged victim of a
rape or other sexual assault. These rules exist in the federal system and across
the states to protect victims of rape or other sexual offenses from the
humiliation of having their sexual history presented in a public forum.
104. See Knox v. State, 365 So. 2d 349, 350 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978) (permitting
evidence of the victim’s previous sexual intercourse with the accused).
105. See Jamie Goss Dempsey, Fells v. State: Good Decision on Procedural
Grounds, Dangerous Precedent for Future Application of Arkansas’s Rape Shield
Statute, 59 ARK. L. REV. 943, 951-52 (2007) (describing the legal movement toward
rape shield statutes, from Arkansas’s allowance of evidence of the victim’s
“unchastity” at common law to contemporary adoption by all states of some form of
statutory rape protection).
106. See Friedland, supra note 46, at 487, 519 (1991) (concluding that “[b]ecause
evidentiary rules, rape shield statutes and jury instructions all have failed to address
specifically the impact of the culture of acceptance on nonverbal conduct, jurors
continue to perpetuate latent gender stereotypes and biases”).
107. See id. at 518 (explaining that rape shield laws do not protect rape victims from
the culture of acceptance of gender biases).

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol17/iss1/2

20

Alexander: Girls Gone Wild and Rape Law: Revising the Contractual Concept of

2009]

“GIRLS GONE WILD” AND RAPE LAW

61

and the accused offered to support a contention that the alleged
offense was not accomplished by force, threat or intimidation or
through the use of the complaining witness’s mental incapacity or
physical helplessness, provided that the sexual conduct occurred
within a period of time reasonably proximate to the offense charged
under the circumstances of this case; or
(3) Evidence offered to rebut evidence of the complaining witness’s
prior sexual conduct introduced by the prosecution.
(B) Nothing contained in this section shall prohibit the accused from
presenting evidence relevant to show that the complaining witness had a
motive to fabricate the charge against the accused. If such evidence
relates to the past sexual conduct of the complaining witness with a
person other than the accused, it shall not be admitted and may not be
referred to at any preliminary hearing or trial unless the party offering
same files a written notice generally describing the evidence prior to the
introduction of any evidence, or the opening statement of either counsel,
whichever first occurs, at the preliminary hearing or trial at which the
admission of the evidence may be sought.108

Section (B) is a common section of rape shield statutes that allows
defendants to circumvent the rape shield law and introduce evidence of past
sexual conduct. Once jurors are given an opportunity to hear about the
sexual history of the accused, the likelihood is increased that the
information will create bias in the mind of the jury.109 Generally, it is
sufficient for the court to determine that the information in question is
“relevant.”110 When weighing the probative value of the information
against its potential bias in cases, courts should anticipate that, in cases
involving non-traditional victims, gender bias will almost always outweigh
the probative value of the evidence.111 Consequently, this balancing test,
measuring bias versus probative value, is illusory at best and, most of the
time, extremely detrimental to the victim.112 In states with a “reasonable
inference of consent” standard, individuals involved in multi-partner sexual
activities, for example, would most likely not be able to overcome the
inference of consent to all partners once evidence is introduced that the
victim gave consent to at least one partner.113
108. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2–67.7 (2008); Cairns v. Commonwealth, 579 S.E.2d 340,
345-46 (Va. Ct. App. 2003).
109. See Friedland, supra note 46, at 517-18.
110. See Josh Maggard, Courting Disaster: Re-Evaluating Rape Shields in Light of
People v. Bryant, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1341, 1357-58 (2005) (stating that since relevance
of evidence is a low standard to meet, courts may accept sexual history as relevant to
the case).
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See J.B. Glen, Annotation, Admissibility in Rape Cases of Evidence of Previous
Unchastity, or Reputation for Unchastity, of Prosecutrix, 140 A.L.R. 364, § 3 (1942);
see also Tom Lininger, Bearing the Cross, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1353, 1391 (2005).
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IV. DETRIMENTAL INFLUENCE OF THE CONTRACTUAL STANDARD IN
NON-TRADITIONAL RAPE CASES
A. The Prostitution Cases
The Rape Shield law has often been circumvented, particularly in
cases where the accused has made non-traditional sexual choices.114 This is
exemplified in rape cases where evidence introduced at trial showed that
the victim engaged in prostitution.115 In these cases, the non-traditional
choices of the victims often become central to the determination of the
case. 116 The issue of credibility, then, turns less on whether the alleged
victim’s story is credible and/or whether the weight of the evidence weighs
against the defendant, but rather on how her sexual history and prior
choices affect her credibility.117 For example, Georgia’s version of the
Rape Shield Statute118 requires that if
In any prosecution for a violation of . . . Code Section 16-6-22.2, relating
to aggravated sexual battery, evidence relating to the past sexual
behavior of the complaining witness may be introduced if the court,
114. See Lininger, supra note 113, at 1390-91 (criticizing exceptions to rape shield
laws, such as the exceptions listed in Federal Rules of Evidence 412, because they spur
“gamesmanship by the defense,” whereby evidence of other sexual partners may be
used to inject doubt as to the veracity of the victim’s claims).
115. See Ann Althouse, The Lying Woman, The Devious Prostitute, and Other
Stories from the Evidence Casebook, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 914, 963 (1994) (“[P]rostitutes
are frequent targets of rape whose complaints are almost never taken seriously . . . the
problem seems also to create the opportunity for someone to tap the old joke—
sometimes presented as a serious argument in criminal law classes—that with a
prostitute, nonconsensual sex is never rape, only theft.”).
116. See Andrea A. Curcio, The Georgia Roundtable Discussion Model: Another
Way to Approach Reforming Rape Laws, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 565, 610 (2004) (noting
that “many jurors believe that a prostitute cannot be raped or that the only ‘real’ rape is
stranger rape.”).
117. See Dana Vetterhoffer, No Means No: Weakening Sexism in Rape Law by
Legitimizing Post-Penetration Rape, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1229, 1253 (2005) (noting
that the credibility of rape victims is often evaluated based on the victim’s prior sexual
behavior).
118. Part (a) of GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2-3 (2008) is consistent with the goal of the
rape shield law. It states that
[i]n any prosecution for a violation of Code Section 16-6-1, relating to rape;
Code Section 16-6-2, relating to aggravated sodomy; Code Section 16-6-4,
relating to aggravated child molestation; or Code Section 16-6-22.2, relating to
aggravated sexual battery, evidence relating to the past sexual behavior of the
complaining witness shall not be admissible, either as direct evidence or on
cross-examination of the complaining witness or other witnesses, except as
provided in this Code section. For the purposes of this Code section, evidence
of past sexual behavior includes, but is not limited to, evidence of the
complaining witness’s marital history, mode of dress, general reputation for
promiscuity, non-chastity, or sexual mores contrary to the community
standards.
Id. § 24-2-3(a). But see GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2-3(b) (undermining the purpose of the
rape shield law by allowing the “subjective” inference of the defendant to be
determinative).
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following the procedure described in subsection (c) of this Code section,
finds that the past sexual behavior directly involved the participation of
the accused and finds that the evidence expected to be introduced
supports an inference that the accused could have reasonably believed
that the complaining witness consented to the conduct complained of in
the prosecution.119

This standard compromises any chances the Georgia rape shield statute
might have of protecting non-traditional victims.120 Unfortunately, genderbiased notions of acceptable behaviors by women are such that any
behavior that deviates from what is considered acceptable will be
interpreted as supporting “an inference that the accused could have
reasonably believed”121 that consent was given. The fact that the
perspective from which consent is determined is that of the accused is
additionally harmful to rape victims.122 This subjective standard is another
example of the use of the contractual standard of consent in an attempt to
provide remedies for perceived harm to the accused, even if the perception
of consent is false. The continuum-based standard would require that the
onus be placed on the accused to ensure that consent was obtained
expressly with clear words of assent from the other party at every step of
the interaction.
This contractual standard proved to be detrimental to the accuser in Ivey
v. State.123 In Ivey, the defendant succeeded in circumventing the Georgia
rape shield statute by claiming “that the trial court erred by granting the
State’s motion in limine, premised on Georgia’s Rape Shield Statute, to
exclude all evidence of his sexual history with the victim . . . .”124 The
defendant in Ivey was convicted of aggravated sodomy. On trial the
evidence presented revealed that “[a]fter the incident, police took S.R. [the
victim,] to a medical center where a rape examination revealed anal
119. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2-3(b).
120. Susan Hanley Kosse, Race, Riches, and Reporters: Do Race and Class Impact

Media Rape Narratives? An Analysis of the Duke Lacrosse Case, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 243,
251 (2007) (“Overdetermined by class and race, the black-woman-as-whore appears
nearly as often as black women are to be found in representations of American
culture.”).
The figure of the oversexed-black Jezebel has had amazing longevity. She is to
be found in movies made in the 1980s and 1990s—She’s Gotta Have It, Jungle
Fever, City of Hope—in which black female characters are still likely to be
shown unclothed, in bed, and in the midst of coitus. Mammy, welfare cheat,
Jezebel, period.
Id. at 252.
121. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2-3(b).
122. See Vetterhoffer, supra note 117, at 1230 (“How a female victim of rape would
realistically respond to such an assault [is] deemed irrelevant . . . . Although women
are the gender most often raped, men are the ones tinkering with exactly what that term
means. The male perspective has and continues to dominate.”).
123. Ivey v. State, 590 S.E.2d 781, 782 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).
124. Id.
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bleeding and tears.”125 The record also showed that,
at around 3:00 a.m. on April 22, 2001, Officer Jonathan Williams was on
motorcycle patrol when Ivey’s car passed him at a high rate of speed. As
Officer Williams activated his emergency lights to stop Ivey for
speeding, S.R. burst out of the passenger door, fell on her knees, and
yelled that she had been raped. After accelerating his car and attempting
to elude the officer, Ivey stopped the car, and he was later forcefully
removed from his vehicle and handcuffed after resisting arrest. At trial,
S.R. testified that Ivey drove her to a remote area and forced her to
engage in both [sic] oral, vaginal, and anal sex.126

Despite all this evidence, the appeals court determined that the victim’s
past sexual history as a prostitute should have been introduced and could
have been determinative. At the motion in limine hearing, both defendant
and complaining witness “testified that they had an ongoing relationship
for a period of at least five years, during which time Ivey paid S.R., an
active prostitute, for sex on at least five occasions.”127 The defendant
argued that sexual intercourse the night of the alleged rape was the result of
a sexual transaction. He claimed that he went to the alleged victim’s house
that night to solicit sex. The appeals court distinguished Ivey from Davis v.
State, a prior case, where the court excluded evidence of the victim’s past
history as a prostitute by stating:
In Davis, there is no indication that the complaining witness admitted a
prior sexual relationship with the defendant. In the case now before us,
on the other hand, S.R. has admitted that she and Ivey had a sexual
relationship spanning a five-year period . . . . Furthermore, the injuries
suffered by the complaining witness in Davis were far greater than those
suffered by the complaining witness in this case. In Davis, the
complaining witness was savagely beaten, thereby supporting the trial
court’s conclusion that the defendant could not have reasonably believed
that the sexual act on the date in question was consensual. In contrast,
the injuries suffered by the complaining witness in this case, though
regrettable, are not indicative of the type of brutal assault in Davis.128

This reasoning perpetuates the idea that the ideal rape victim, especially
non-traditional victims, at the very least must suffer extreme, near-death
injuries in order to be credible. In Ivey, the victim suffered substantial
injuries. However, the victim’s profession caused the court to raise the
threshold for credibility even higher than the already steep threshold
accorded to rape victims.129 Finally, the court makes the fact that the
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 787 (Phipps, J., dissenting).
Id. at 782 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id. at 784.
Cf. Davis v. State, 509 S.E.2d 655, 657 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (affirming the trial
court’s rejection of evidence of the victim’s past sexual history with Davis when she
volunteered sex with him for money or drugs).
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victim had a prior relationship with the accused determinative, a decision
that inevitably highly prejudices victims of rape.130
The fact that the Ivey court concluded that the jury could have
reasonably inferred consent in this instance131 demonstrates the precarious
and vulnerable situations in which non-traditional rape victims, such as
prostitutes, are placed. Any past sexual activity with the victim is
interpreted as probative and as implying consent.132 Considering that a
great number of cases of violence against women involve cases where the
victim was familiar or intimate with the perpetrator, these cases make it
easier for rapists to escape justice.133
The gender-bias inherent in courts’ treatment of non-traditional victims
is illustrated further in Jackson v. State, a precedent-setting case in
Georgia.134 In Jackson, the defendant alleged that the brutal interaction
between the victim and him was the result of sex in exchange for cocaine.
The court noted:
a cohort, Larry Brown, confronted a woman on the street who they
believed had failed to pay for cocaine received from Jackson. Despite
her protests, Jackson grabbed her arm and forced her down some steps
into an isolated area. When the woman denied receiving the cocaine and
denied having money to pay, Brown threatened to kill her and Jackson
pointed a knife at her within a foot of her face. While Jackson emptied
her purse, Brown removed her clothes and fondled her breasts, vagina,
and anus to search for the cocaine. Finding no cocaine and no money,
Jackson demanded oral sex from the woman, who vigorously protested.
Holding the knife, Jackson forced her into an outdoor-bricked area of the
local community center and with the assistance of Brown forced her
mouth onto Jackson’s penis. Over the next two hours, the protesting
woman was subjected to a series of brutal and often simultaneous sexual
assaults, ranging from anal and vaginal intercourse to fellatio to beltwhippings on her buttocks and fire near her vagina, and involving
Jackson, Brown, McGinty, and other men. A crowd including children
gathered to watch the assaults, which eventually ended when the battered
woman fainted and a neighbor came to her rescue.135

Despite these egregious acts, the Jackson court, pursuant to a motion in
130. See id. (discussing the Rape Shield Statute as not barring evidence of the
victim’s past sexual behavior if it directly involves the accused, thereby supporting an
inference that the accused reasonably believed the victim consented, but only if the
evidence will substantially support this conclusion).
131. See Ivey, 590 S.E.2d at 784.
132. See id. (reviewing the victim and defendant’s ongoing sexual relationship for
pay for at least five years).
133. See Friedland, supra note 46, at 488-89 (arguing that because society has a
more permissive attitude toward acquaintance rape, there is a low incidence of reported
acquaintance rape and few successfully prosecuted acquaintance rape cases).
134. Jackson v. State, 562 S.E.2d 847, 848-49 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002).
135. Id.
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limine, allowed some evidence of the victim’s past relationship with the
accused, mainly from the accused himself.136 On appeal, Jackson argued
that the trial court improperly limited the evidence he could introduce
during the in limine hearing. A review of the proceeding at trial revealed,
however, that this contention was far from true. In fact, Jackson was given
multiple chances to introduce additional evidence of the victim’s past
sexual history and failed to do so.137 Despite his tardiness, Jackson was
still able to introduce his own testimony of the victim’s sexual history.138
Were it not for Jackson’s own delay in providing further evidence, as the
court encouraged him139 to do, he might not have been convicted by the
jury.
Similarly, in People v. Slovinsky,140 the Rape Shield Statute was easily
circumvented.141 In response to defendant’s argument that evidence of the
complainant’s profession as a prostitute should have been allowed, the
court relied on cases from various jurisdictions that “indicate[d] a
willingness on the part of some jurisdictions to allow evidence that a victim
is a prostitute when the defense is consent and a proper showing thereof has
been made.”142 The court reasoned further that “[i]n our case, we conclude
that evidence of the victim’s prior sexual activity is absolutely critical in
ensuring defendant a fair trial and in preserving his confrontation right.
Without this evidence, defendant would be precluded from presenting his
defense of consent.”143 The fact that evidence of prostitution can be
136. Id. at 849-50.
137. Id. at 850.

Jackson proffered only his testimony at the in-camera hearing. Not only did he
not proffer testimony from others, but when the State observed that Jackson
had no independent witnesses to the sexual relationship, Jackson agreed,
testifying that no one else knew about his sexual relationship with the victim.
Based on Jackson’s proffer, the court ruled his testimony was admissible. The
court expressly left open the door to allow any party during the trial to request
another in-camera hearing to elicit additional testimony if that party wanted to
have anyone else testify to prior sexual conduct of the victim. During the trial,
the court twice more reminded the parties of this opportunity. Although
Jackson stated during trial that he had other witnesses to testify that the victim
gave sex for drugs, Jackson never requested another in-camera hearing nor
proffered the testimony of these witnesses, and he never showed that these
witnesses could testify about his personal sexual relationship with the victim.
Id.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id.
Id. at 848-49.
420 N.W.2d 145 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988).
See id. at 153 (determining that it was appropriate to introduce evidence of the
victim’s past sexual experience as a prostitute since the defendant claimed the victim
had consented to an act of prostitution and consent was a fact at issue).
142. See id. at 155 (citing cases from Arizona, California, and Indiana as support).
143. See id. (finding that unless the defendant was allowed to introduce the victim’s
sexual history as a prostitute, it would effectively preclude the defendant from
presenting his defense that the victim consented to the acts; the court did not recognize
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determinative in establishing consent undermines the very foundation of
the Rape Shield Statute.144 The Slovinsky court also deemed admissible
evidence of the victim’s behavior whenever it can show bias on the part of
the victim.145
In Massachusetts, like in many other states, the trial judge has the
discretion to allow impeachment of a sexual assault complainant by prior
conviction of a sexual offense, such as prostitution, despite the
Massachusetts rape shield law.146 The Massachusetts statute does not allow
the victim’s sexual history to be an issue unless: (1) the victim’s sexual
conduct is with the defendant, or (2) there is evidence of recent conduct of
the victim that is alleged to be the cause of a physical feature,
characteristic, or condition of the victim.147 In these instances, the judge is
required to hold a hearing on the motion to hear the defendant’s offer of
proof and determine whether the impeachment value of the evidence
outweighs any prejudicial effect to the victim and whether it is relevant to
the victim’s bias or motive to fabricate.148 It is hard to imagine how any
evidence of the victim’s past sexual conduct with the accused could ever be
probative enough to explain the perpetration of such violence on the victim,
as seen in the prostitute rape cases discussed above. Nonetheless, the Ivey
court held that “[f]rom these facts, the jury could certainly draw a
reasonable inference, based on reason and common sense, that Ivey might
have believed that the sexual acts were consensual.”149 This reasonable
belief standard, however, will always be problematic because it is mainly
based on what a reasonable man in the defendant’s situation would have
believed. Limiting the evaluation of the victim’s credibility to the actual
that such evidence is the type the rape shield law intended to make inadmissible).
144. See id. at 153 (“We conclude that this evidence is admissible on the issues of
consent and right of confrontation.”).
145. See id. at 177-80 (reiterating that evidence, even concerning consent in a rape
case, should be permitted so long as it tends to make a fact at issue more probable and
is not substantially outweighed by prejudice).
146. See Commonwealth v. Harris, 825 N.E.2d 58, 64 (Mass. 2005) (asserting that
evidence that may cause prejudice can be ameliorated by giving a limiting instruction
to the jury).
147. See MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch. 233, § 21B (LexisNexis 2008) (explaining that
admitting evidence of the victim’s sexual history is appropriate because it is relevant to
show the victim’s bias and involves a balancing between the victim’s interest in
privacy and the defendant’s right to confront witnesses against him).
148. See Commonwealth v. McGeoghean, 593 N.E.2d 229, 231 (Mass. 1992)
(holding that it was appropriate to introduce testimony of a mother burning her child
with cigarettes because the evidence was relevant to the defendant’s malicious state of
mind and its probative value outweighed the possible prejudice); Commonwealth v.
Velasquez, 718 N.E.2d 398 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999) (finding that admitting evidence
about prior convictions was appropriate because it tended to prove the defendant’s state
of mind rather than a propensity to commit the crime with which the defendant was
charged). See Anderson, supra note 9, at 84-90 (discussing the purpose of rape shield
laws and their effect in the courtroom); Berger, supra note 39.
149. See Ivey v. State, 590 S.E.2d 781, 783 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003).
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case being litigated would still be consistent with concerns for the
defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights. Rather than allowing a victim’s
credibility to be measured according to prior or contemporaneous sexual
relationships, a deep investigation of the facts involved in the case, the
introduction of psychological evaluations, the absence or presence of
causal links to the defendant and the establishment of both parties’
credibility based on detailed dissection of both parties’ consistent
narrations of the events at hand, are all alternative tools for attempting to
unveil the truth. These suggestions are in no way meant to undermine the
complexity of rape cases. The fact is, however, that the difficulties inherent
in litigating rape cases should never serve as excuses for allowing genderbiased resolutions of these cases.
B. Multi-Partner Rape Cases
Other types of non-traditional rape victims involved victims who are
labeled by society as promiscuous because of a history of adultery or
evidence of more than one sexual partner.150 State v. Sanchez-Lahora
involved a victim with whom the defendant alleged a secret relationship
while she had a boyfriend.151 During the in limine hearing, the defendant
testified that he had met the victim several months before November 6,
1998. He stated that they developed a friendship, which eventually
evolved into a secret sexual relationship. The defendant estimated that
they had sexual intercourse 11 to 14 times in various locations . . . he and
the victim concealed this relationship from the victim’s boyfriend. The
defendant admitted to having sexual intercourse with the victim on
November 6, but he asserted that she participated voluntarily.152

In Sanchez-Lahora, the Nebraska court made it clear that a judge is only
to determine the relevance of evidence, while the issue of credibility is left
entirely to the jury.153 Based on that standard, the appellate court
concluded that the lower court had erred by excluding evidence that the
defendant engaged in sexual relations with the victim several times before
the incident.154
Nebraska’s rape shield law demonstrates bias against non-traditional
150. See Amanda O. Davis, Comment, Clarifying the Issue of Consent: The
Evolution of Post-Penetration Rape Law, 34 STETSON L. REV. 729, 751 (2005)
(recognizing the popular notion that women viewed as promiscuous will be less
affected by rape than their virginal counterparts).
151. See 616 N.W.2d 810, 814 (Neb. Ct. App. 2000).
152. See id.
153. See id. at 820 (reasoning that the language “tends to prove” demonstrates that
the reliability of prior sexual conduct evidence goes to the credibility of the evidence,
which is for the jury to decide, rather than admissibility of the evidence).
154. See id. (finding evidence of prior sexual conduct between the victim and the
defendant as tending to establish a pattern of conduct relevant to consent, a fact at
issue, and therefore admissible).
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sexual choices even further. On the issue of admissibility of past sexual
behavior, the statute states:
Upon motion to the court by either party in a prosecution in a case of
sexual assault, an in camera hearing shall be conducted in the presence
of the judge, under guidelines established by the judge, to determine the
relevance of evidence of the victim’s or the defendant’s past sexual
behavior. Evidence of a victim’s past sexual behavior shall not be
admissible unless such evidence is: (a) Evidence of past sexual behavior
with persons other than the defendant . . . or (b) evidence of past sexual
behavior with the defendant when such evidence is offered by the
defendant on the issue of whether the victim consented to the sexual
behavior upon which the sexual assault is alleged if it is first established
to the court that such activity shows such a relation to the conduct
involved in the case and tends to establish a pattern of conduct or
behavior on the part of the victim as to be relevant to the issue of
consent.155

The court admitted in its opinion that the Nebraska statute was more
stringent than the federal rule of evidence after which it was modeled. The
court emphasized that an assessment of credibility depended on whether
the evidence established a pattern on the part of the victim relevant to the
issue of consent.156 That very language exemplifies the types of sexual
profiling women and non-traditional victims face in the adjudication of
rape cases. Furthermore, with such a strict standard, the rape shield statute
is completely eroded.
The pretext given for making this kind of evidence relevant to consent is
that the alleged victim has a motive to lie to the male witness about her
sexual encounter when she is conducting a sexual relationship with
someone else.157 The allowance of such arguments does not only defy the
spirit of the Rape Shield Statute, but it also perpetuates sexist notions about
women and sexuality. Such evidence should be inadmissible on its face.
In essence, by allowing the defendant’s evidence of past sexual experiences
with the victim, the court sanctioned the notion that a woman is estopped
from withholding consent when she has consented at least once to sexual
interaction.
In multi-partner rape cases, the traditional view of consent leads to
further inequities.158 The term “multi-party rape cases” refers to incidents
155. See NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-321 (LexisNexis 2008) (emphasis added).
156. See Sanchez-Lahora, 616 N.W.2d at 818 (proclaiming that establishing consent

is the sole factor in determining the admissibility of prior sexual conduct with the
defendant).
157. See Anderson, supra note 9, at 52-53 (revealing that historically a woman’s
rape claim was only believed when she was chaste and it was otherwise assumed that
the woman consented to the sexual advances and subsequently lied about the
encounter).
158. See Clifford S. Fishman, Consent, Credibility, and the Constitution: Evidence
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where rape occurs in the context of group sex.159 Allegations of rape that
originate from group sex have become more prevalent among young
people, particularly on college campuses and during spring break trips.160
In these contexts, the tendency to look for implicit indications of consent
by simply looking at the women’s behavior is a great impediment to
finding lack of consent.161 Society’s view of sex and appropriate behavior
by women is such that multi-party sex shocks the conscience of traditional
jurors and triers of fact.162 Consequently, when parties allege rape in those
contexts, the victim has to surmount the assumption that consent to multiparty sexual activity necessarily equals consent to anything that happens
during that interaction.163 At the very least, this view is based on the tort
theory assumption of risk, which is often applied to behaviors defined as
“risky” for women. The “inverse opposite of the rape-preventing subject is
the risky woman . . . who avoids personal responsibility for sexual safety,”
and who “chooses” to engage in a “high-risk lifestyle.”164
Consider the case of Airwoman 1st Class Cassandra M. Hernandez, an
Air Force officer who, after withdrawing her complaint subsequent to
alleging gang rape, was herself prosecuted.
Hernandez said she was gang-raped at a party on May 13, 2006. The Air
Force charged Airman Russell J. Basile in the incident. Later, however,
Hernandez said she felt pressured by the Air Force judicial process and
intimidated by Basile’s defense attorney, an Air Force lawyer, who she
Relating to a Sex Offense Complainant’s Past Sexual Behavior, 44 CATH. U. L. REV.
709, 747 (1995) (stating that multi-partner sex “strikes most people as bizarre,
disgusting, and unlikely” and thus concluding that “a jury may be inclined to view a
consent defense with inherent disbelief”).
159. See Kimberly M. Trebon, There Is No “I” in Team: The Commission of Group
Sexual Assault by Collegiate and Professional Athletes, 4 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 65, 66-67 (2007) (describing gang rape, where multiple members of
a gang have sexual intercourse with a victim to show camaraderie with other members
of the gang).
160. See, e.g., Jennifer Gaffney, Amending the Violence Against Women Act:
Creating a Rebuttable Presumption of Gender Animus in Rape Cases, 6 J.L. & POL’Y
247, 274-75 (1997) (listing allegations of multi-partner rape by athletes at colleges and
universities, such as a case where three basketball players at Southwestern Michigan
University were charged with raping an eighteen-year-old woman, which they videotaped).
161. See Trebon, supra note 159, at 94 (explaining that a jury may choose to believe
that the victim fabricated the rape rather than concede that a talented young athlete
would commit such an offense).
162. See id. (noting that often times the jury does not want to believe that the rape
occurred for social and personal reasons).
163. See Linda Robayo, Note, The Glen Ridge Trial: New Jersey’s Cue to Amend its
Rape Shield Statute, 19 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 272, 273-77 (1994) (detailing a young
girl’s struggle to explain that she did not consent to giving oral sex or being penetrated
by foreign objects even though she went willingly to the place the sexual assault
occurred and stayed after the assault ended).
164. See Gotell, supra note 32, at 882-84 (finding that fact finders mistake women’s
alternative lifestyle, such as living on the street, as an implicit choice that these women
want to engage in risky behaviors).
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said interviewed her without her victim’s advocate present. “I just
wanted to go to work and not have this hanging over my head. I just
wanted to be normal,” Hernandez said Wednesday.165

In a strange twist of events the Air Force charged her with indecent
behavior for having sex with more than one man. The commander of “her
unit signed papers charging Hernandez with committing an indecent act by
having sexual relations with Airman 1st Class Jerrell W. Apache while
Basile and Airman Rotez J. Butler watched.”166 Airwoman Hernandez was
tried even before her rape case received adjudication. The papers filed by
the defendants played into obvious stereotypes by describing her as
promiscuous and indecent. For example, “[i]n written statements to her
attorneys, the three accused airmen call the sex consensual. One said
Hernandez wore ‘skin tight’ clothes, danced in a ‘promiscuous way’ and
later stripped naked.”167 It is unthinkable that a victim would be charged
and prosecuted because of her decision not to testify in the court martial
proceedings adjudicating her rape claim. The trauma experienced by
women during rape trials is well documented.168 In addition, it is reported
that Airwoman Hernandez experienced specific pressure from the Air
Force personnel handling her case.169 This case is a specific representation
of our society’s tendency to condemn the victim in rape cases. Gang rape
cases where the victim knew at least one of the accused are particularly
challenging because the defense tends to attack the credibility of the
victim170 and infer consent from unrelated sexual activities.171 Any
mention that a rape victim might have flirted or socialized with the
defendants on the night of the rape is sometimes enough to shatter the

165. See Kelcey Carlson, Air Force Charges Turn Woman from Rape Victim to
Defendant, W.R.A.L., Aug. 6, 2007, available at http://www.wral.com/news/local
/story/1674488/ (depicting how a woman who engaged in “risky” behavior, such as
drinking alcohol while under the age of twenty-one, was charged with committing
indecent acts with three men, even though she had previously accused one of the men
of raping her).
166. See id. (detailing how the Air Force turned the tables and punished the victim
for engaging in behaviors that were deemed risky and promiscuous).
167. See id.
168. See, e.g., id. (acknowledging in a letter to the Texas Governor that she decided
not to testify because she felt that the pressure of the judicial system was difficult to
endure and that it was not in her best interest).
169. See id. (“Capts. Christopher Eason and Omar Ashmawy, who are representing
Hernandez, say the Air Force failed to follow its own procedures and is persecuting
her.”).
170. See Robayo, supra note 163, at 276 (noting that although the defendants were
on trial for the brutal rape of their incompetent peer “[d]uring the judicial proceedings,
Ann, [the victim] was actually on trial”).
171. See id. at 282-83 (recognizing that fact finders often do not consider a sexual
encounter rape when the victim knows the offender because stereotypes of male
aggression and female passivity lead the fact finder to conclude that a woman is merely
an object to take sex from).
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victim’s credibility.172 This type of evidence of the victim’s “behavior” is
often found probative enough to disregard a rape shield law’s mandate
against prejudicing the victim.173
The rigid contractual notions of consent in the adjudication of rape cases
are particularly harmful to non-traditional rape victims. The prejudicial
effect of this passive idea of consent is heightened in circumstances where
women engaged in behaviors that incurred societal disapproval.174 The
publicized hypersexual behavior of students on spring break is an example
of such behaviors.175 Most of us are, by now, quite familiar with the
numerous narratives describing the heightened sexual activity that takes
place during college spring break trips.176 The American Medical
Association reported in March 2006 that:
[s]izable numbers [of college women] reported getting sick from
drinking, and blacking out and engaging in unprotected sex or sex with
more than one partner . . . . About thirty percent of women surveyed
said spring break trips with sun and alcohol are an essential part of
college life . . . . About forty percent said they regretted passing out or
not remembering what they did . . . . Ten percent said they regretted
engaging in public or group sexual activity.177

These types of activities sometimes involve women who are raped on the
same night that they consented to sexual intercourse with multiple
partners.178 For the most part, we think of the concept of rape as an all or
nothing grant or denial of consent.179 How, then, should we legally make
172. See Alexandre, supra note 17, at 185-86 (asserting that the credibility of the
victim is undermined if the victim engages in these types of behaviors because fact
finders have determined that the victim is estopped from refusing access to her body).
173. See id. at 186 (concluding that evidence which the rape shield law is intended
to exclude is often admitted when trying to prove whether a victim acted like an
individual who was raped).
174. See Aviva Orenstein, Special Issues Raised by Rape Trials, 76 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1585, 1588 (2007) (“Although to modern ears the requirement of chastity seems
obsolete, the tendency to blame victims for ‘asking for it’ (by flirting, taking a man to
her room, or drinking), or to believe that the victim was lying to cover an indiscretion
or to gain revenge, still rings true. We do not mind if a rape victim has had some
reasonable sexual experience, but if she is too promiscuous, she will fall into the
category of ‘asking for it.’”).
175. See Marco R. della Cava, Spring Break Gone Wild, USA TODAY, Mar. 30,
2005, available at http://www.usatoday.com/life/lifestyle/2005-03-30-spring-break_x.
htm (describing the sex and alcohol focused environment of spring break trips taken by
contemporary youth).
176. Id.
177. See Girls Warned About Spring Break Dangers: Risky Behavior Common
Among Young Women, According to AMA Survey, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 17, 2006,
available at http://www.msnbc.com/id/11726292.
178. See Alexandre, supra note 17, at 186, n.43, 197 (asserting that the problem with
determining consent subjectively is that a woman may decide to withdraw her consent
once it has been given which can lead to an improper assessment of consent).
179. See MCGREGOR, supra note 49, at 120 (“Consent is all or nothing, that is, either
a person consents to something or not . . . .”).
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sense of situations involving women who, while engaged in multi-partner
sexual activities, give consent to touching by some partners but not to
others? How should we measure consent in these contexts? And above all,
how do we prevent society’s biases and stereotypes from influencing the
outcome of these types of cases?
Underlying all these cases is the notion that where a woman grants
access to her body in these non-traditional contexts, access means
“unlimited access” and she is estopped from withdrawing her grant of
access.180 The proposed continuum-based idea of consent would be
particularly instrumental in these contexts. Under this proposed view of
consent, when a woman engages in a multi-party sexual transaction,
consent would not be imputed to everything that happens in the course of
that interaction. Thus, if she withdraws consent at any time, the withdrawal
of consent would be effective at the time of the withdrawal, regardless of
what happened before. Under this method of viewing consent, “no” would
only mean “no,” but “yes” would not be an absolute “yes.” A woman’s
“yes” at one moment would not be forced on her for the rest of her
interaction(s) with the defendant(s). Instead, “yes” will always be attached
with a caveat that the “yes” can be withdrawn by the woman and the
transaction(s) terminated at any time. This continuum-based view of
consent would help take us away from the mainstream perception of sexual
negotiations as equivalent to transactions for the sale of goods or
services.181

V. PROPOSAL FOR ERADICATING GENDER BIAS FROM RAPE SHIELD
STATUTES WITHOUT PREJUDICING INNOCENT DEFENDANTS
As discussed above, the contractual view of consent has contributed to
limit the implementation of the Rape Shield Statute.182 To reverse the
damage caused by this rigid view of consent, I propose a complete revision
of the biased reasonableness standards and implicit contractual idea of
consent often used by courts in rape cases. I propose that we revise the

180. See Alexandre, supra note 17, at 185-86 (asserting that the credibility of the
victim is undermined if the victim engages in these types of behaviors because fact
finders have determined that the victim can no longer refuse access to her body).
181. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 22 (1981) (allowing
manifestation of mutual assent to be found even though “neither offer nor acceptance
can be identified and even though the moment of formation cannot be determined”),
and U.C.C. § 2-606 (2004) (defining acceptance as a failure to make an effective
rejection), with CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.6 (West 2008) (defining consent as “positive
cooperation in act or attitude pursuant to an exercise of free will”).
182. See McHugh, supra note 45, at 1685-87, 1691 (reasoning that a special
contractual definition of consent similar to duress has been used in rape cases; it
requires the victim to prove that she did not consent to the intercourse and that the
alleged perpetrator used force).
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standard of review for consent from a subjective standard of what a
reasonable man in the defendant’s situation would have done to what a
reasonable person with a completely bias-free understanding of sexual
relations between men and women would do. This understanding would
have to include an understanding that a woman may choose to have sex
with as many partners as she wishes, contemporaneously and otherwise,
and be entitled to say no at any point.
Furthermore, a new Rape Shield Statute must also require that the
absence of force not be computed in the calculation of whether consent
occurred. The determination of consent should be an objective standard,
which considers consent to the whole transaction and during the whole time
of the sexual interaction. These ideas are encapsulated in the proposed
continuum-based standard of consent.183
In addition, the interests of non-traditional victims should be a foremost
priority in any reforms to rape shield law. This should be the case because
non-traditional victims are the most likely to be prejudiced in the rape
context. In order to resolve these multi-partner cases without problems,
evidence of contemporaneous sexual behavior should only be admissible if
there is direct and concrete evidence that the victim consented to sex with
the defendant. The type of evidence in question cannot be evidence of past
experiences or evidence gathered as a result of an inference from the
victim’s behavior. In order for such evidence to be admissible, it must be
actual and concrete evidence.
Finally, the litigation of these cases must include judge and jury
instructions that require juries to consciously disregard any gender bias.
Adding a requirement that the trier of fact explain in a concrete way the
reason it reached a bias-free decision should further test the mandatory
bias-free process. This new requirement would necessitate that judges and
juries receive specific training designed to bring the issues of gender
construction to the forefront.184 By bringing an awareness of the role that
gender construction and normative views play regarding acceptable uses of
the female body, we can begin the process of eradicating the effect of
gender bias in decision-making. Furthermore, judges should be required to
provide clear and bias-free support for decisions regarding the denial or
grant of motions in limine. The construction of jury instructions is crucial
to the outcome of cases, particularly rape cases.185 Juries look to guidance
183. See supra p. 55-56.
184. See Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 3, at 1377 (concluding that bias is

particularly strong in acquaintance rape).
185. See Abbe Smith, “Nice Work If You Can Get It”: “Ethical” Jury Selection in
Criminal Defense, 67 FORHAM L. REV. 523, 559-60 (1998) (noting that “empirical
studies demonstrate that women jurors are more likely to convict rape defendants than
their male counterparts . . . [and are] less influenced by a rape complainant’s virginity
or social status . . . [whereas] men tend to identify more with the defendant and find the
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from judges to help them determine what factors they should take into
account in reaching their decisions. Consequently, it is crucial to mandate
that judges draft deliberate and carefully worded jury instructions with an
express mandate that juries exclude from deliberation facts that lead to
sexist conclusions and interpretations about a particular victim’s behavior.
The above proposal serves three goals. First, it provides a system for
considering consent in rape cases that helps eliminate the influence of
gender bias in the deliberation of these cases. Second, it provides an
efficient alternative to the de facto contract-based view of consent that
courts have applied. Third, it ensures a fairer adjudication of rape cases
with no encroachments on defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights. Because
it requires hard concrete evidence of consent, defendants have the
opportunity to provide such evidence and confront their accusers. Due to
the particular nature of rape, which is an unlawful, unwanted, violent
invasion of a woman’s body, the assumption should be that all consent to
sex with a woman must be proved concretely.
VI. POLICY REASONS SUPPORTING THE PROPOSAL FOR A
CONTINUUM-BASED CONSENT
The proposed continuum-based standard of consent is more efficient
because it does not delve into the quagmire of inferring consent based on
implicit or potentially relevant past behavior.186 It simply looks at whether
consent was expressly granted at any time and whether it was withdrawn at
any time during the interaction(s) between defendant and victim and views
any moment where consent is withdrawn as a cancellation of any prior
consent. This model thus prevents the pitfall of treating “yes” as
irrevocable consent for all subsequent interactions between defendant and
victim. Even for states that are contemplating the “no means no” approach,
the progress can be curtailed if a rigid “yes” as irrevocable consent is also
imposed. Although an affirmative consent standard would seem to
tangentially draw inferences about women’s sexual agency, it is far too
defendant’s testimony more credible than do women jurors”).
186. See Richardson v. State, 581 S.E.2d 528, 531 (Ga. 2003) (Benham, J.,
dissenting).
[T]he Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as incorporated in
the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees a person accused of a crime the right to
confront the witnesses against him. However, the Confrontation Clause does
not prohibit the imposition of limits on cross-examination. In Delaware v. Van
Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986), the U.S. Supreme Court made it clear that
“trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is
concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on
concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the
issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally
relevant.”
Id.
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flawed to be used as the determinative standard in rape cases.187 Courts
must question the legal acceptance of “yes” as irrevocable consent “in
relation to broader shifts in governance and the new privileged forms of
citizenship they produce.”188 If this rigid contractual view of consent is not
revised, our perceived gains in eradicating biased gender construction in
the application of the law are in actuality very limited.189 The contractual
view of consent will continue to facilitate violence against women.
Violence against women is still a systemic and ongoing problem around
the world. In the United States, the Violence Against Women Act190 was
an attempt at codifying a formal commitment towards the eradication of
gender biases in sexual assault laws.191 The act created a federal right of
action classifying gender-based violence as sex-based discrimination.192
Unfortunately, the VAWA’s “civil provision . . . making actionable crimes
of violence ‘committed because of gender or on the basis of gender,’ 42
U.S.C.S. 13981(d)(1), was found unconstitutional for exceeding the federal
legislative power.”193 The Supreme Court found that the sexual violence
did not implicate interstate commerce and that, consequently, it should be
the purview of states to regulate it.194
Despite this particular domestic setback, local and international
organizations have been working tirelessly in the past decades to reverse
patriarchal perceptions of women’s bodies being of less value.
International bodies such as the Organization of American States (OAS)

187. See Gotell, supra note 32.
188. See id. at 867-68 (distinguishing consent from forced submission and adding an

element to the defense of mistaken consent to require that the defendant took
reasonable steps to obtain consent, which moves the consent standard closer to an
affirmative consent standard).
189. See Richardson, 581 S.E.2d at 529 (“Evidence merely that the victim has or
had a romantic relationship with another man does not reflect on her character for
sexual behavior. Therefore, so long as Richardson confined his questioning to the nonsexual nature of the victim’s former relationships, the statute would not be a basis for
curtailing his cross-examination of her.”); Banks v. State, 366 S.E.2d 228, 230 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1988) (holding the state’s introduction of testimony that the victim was dating
someone at the time of the offense was not an invitation by the defense to introduce
evidence of the victim’s past sexual experience).
190. Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C.S. § 13981 (LexisNexis 2008).
191. Julie Goldscheid, The Civil Rights Remedy of the 1994 Violence Against
Women Act: Struck Down But Not Ruled Out, 39 FAM. L.Q. 157, 160 (2005) (stating
that the purpose of the VAWA civil rights remedy was to “connect violence against
women with the longstanding manifestations of sex inequality that perpetuate women’s
second-class citizenship”).
192. 42 U.S.C.S. § 13981.
193. See MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY, supra note 2, at 744 (explaining that the civil
remedy position was found unconstitutional because it did not affect interstate
commerce).
194. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621-22 (2000) (reasoning that the
Court must be careful to protect the balance of power between the federal and state
governments created by the Fourteenth Amendment).
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recognized in a convention the pivotal role of gender bias in sexual
violence.195 The OAS stated that “violence against women is an offense
against human dignity and a manifestation of the historical unequal power
relations between women and men . . . .”196 This concern should be made a
primordial consideration in the adjudication of all rape and sexual assault
cases, particularly in cases involving non-traditional rape victims who often
suffer the brunt of society’s biased definitions and expectations of
appropriate behavior for women. Today, non-traditional rape victims
occupy all racial and social echelons.197 Still, the more vulnerable groups
and the ones least likely to be believed are women of color and women of
lower economic echelons.198 Further, society’s tacit view of a woman’s
body as property often leads it to judge, with a patriarchal slant, what
constitutes appropriate behavior and proper sexual choices for women in
the context of sexual interactions.199
VII. CONCLUSION
As long as the de facto contractual standards are implemented, the
inherent message is that gender autonomy and agency will be recognized
only as long as women are willing to pay the price. Such a view, in
essence, creates a structure that recognizes only diminished autonomy and
agency. If not revised, this limited grant of autonomy will continue to
create problems of inequity, which will remain unaddressed by our legal
system.
The proposed continuum-based idea of consent honors women’s
autonomy: an autonomy that should be assumed in all sexual endeavors,
while at the same time protecting women from predators. Unlike the
current consent standard, this proposed standard is intent on preventing the
risk that women will be punished for their sexual choices. The non-

195. See Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention on the
Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence Against Women, June 9, 1994,
33 I.L.M. 1534, entered into force March 5, 1995 [hereinafter IAC] (discussing the
importance of quelling gender violence).
196. See MACKINNON, SEX EQUALITY, supra note 2, at 743 (arguing that the United
States lags behind the OAS’s recognition of the systemic bias within their own system
of laws (quoting the IAC Preamble)).
197. See Lynda Olsen-Fulero & Solomon M. Fulero, Commonsense Rape
Judgments: An Empathy-Complexity Theory of Rape Juror Story Making, 3 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL’Y & L. 402, 404 (1997) (noting that there are common misconceptions
regarding social class and rape, especially regarding the “character and sexual history”
of the alleged rape victim).
198. See Theresa M. Beiner, Sexy Dressing Revisited: Does Target Dress Play a
Part in Sexual Harassment Cases?, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 125, 146 (2007)
(“Studies have shown that the rape victim is more likely to be a single, white or black
young female, from a lower social working class.”).
199. Cf. Patriarchy is such a Drag, supra note 25, at 1994 (explaining that married
women were often viewed as the property of their male spouse).
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traditional rape victims, prostitutes, and women engaged in multi-partner
sexual activities used as examples in this Article are but a few examples of
the myriad of women who are indelibly disadvantaged by the judgments
judges and juries make about their sexual choices in the adjudication of
rape cases. The continuum-based idea of consent also moves away from
the pattern of treating sexual encounters as business transactions in which a
purported contract cannot be breached by a woman without penalty. While
it is abundantly clear that tackling the judicial system alone will not solve
this problem, the judicial system, nonetheless, serves as an important site of
reform. Along with the reformation of the judicial system into a gender
bias-free system, there is, of course, an immense need to implement
educational programs regarding the importance of respecting women’s
autonomy and choices in all aspects of our society.
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